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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 20020526-CA 
v. 
RICHARD DALE HOUSTON, 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999) (contained in Addendum A). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
(Supp. 2002), pursuant to a transfer order of the Utah Supreme court dated August 27,2002. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The only issue this Court should reach is whether the trial court properly extended the 
trial date "to a reasonable time outside the disposition period to accommodate, in part, 
defense counsel's schedule." 
The trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute under the 
detainer statute is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Peterson, 2002 UT App 
53, U 5,42 P.3d 1258; State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, fflf 3-4,34 P.3d 790, cert denied, 
42 P.3d 951 (Utah 2002). This Court reviews the underlying legal conclusions for 
correctness and the factual findings for clear error. See Peterson, 2002 UT App 53, ^[5; 
Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, ff 3-4. The attribution of delay to a party is a factual finding, 
reviewed for clear error. See Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, ^ j 4, n.4; State v. Phathammavong, 
860 P.2d 1001,1004 (Utah App. 1993). The determination of the existence of "good cause" 
under the speedy trial statute is a legal conclusion reviewed for correctness. See State v. 
Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 915 (Utah 1998). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The only statute relevant to the issue to be addressed on appeal is Utah Code Ann. § 
77-29-1 (1999), and it is contained in Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Because the chronology of the proceedings in this matter is critical in applying Utah's 
statute on speedy trial rights, Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999), the relevant dates and 
corresponding undisputed facts are presented as follows1: 
Nov. 29, 2001 An information was filed charging defendant Richard Dale 
Houston and Gabriel Valenzuela as co-defendants with one 
count of aggravated robbery (R. 3-5). 
Dec. 8,2001 Defendant signed his "Notice and Request for Disposition of 
Pending Charge(s)" [disposition request] (R. 13-15) (attached in 
Addendum D). 
1A 2002 calendar is included in Addendum C for the reader's convenience. 
2 
Dec. 14, 2001 The prison stamps as received defendant's disposition request 
(id.). Add. D. 
Dec. 20, 2001 Thi. roll call hearing was held at which the preliminary hearing 
was set for January 15, 2002 (R. 16). 
Jan. 15, 2002 A joint preliminary hearing was begun for both defendants, but 
was halted at noon (R. 28-29). Neither counsel was available to 
continue the hearing into the afternoon, and the prosecutor 
raised the fact that a disposition request had been filed (R. 255: 
45). The court informed defense counsel that despite his 
scheduling problem, "we're going to have to push on. I mean, 
I'm not going to do anything that's going to jeopardize the 
detainer. That's not going to happen." (Id.). The court recessed 
the hearing at 12:30 p.m. after scheduling the matter to continue 
the next day (R. 28-29). 
Jan. 16, 2002 Despite "heroic efforts," the court was unable to convince the 
prison to transport defendant for the remainder of the 
preliminary hearing on such short notice (R. 255: 46-47). After 
discussing the detainer problem with counsel, the judge 
attempted to set the matter for January 22 (R. 255: 47). Due to 
a conflict with the schedule of co-defendant's counsel, the 
matter was continued to January 24, the court's next available 
date (id.). 
Jan. 24, 2002 The preliminary hearing was completed, and the court found 
probable cause to bind both defendants over (R. 255:93-94). In 
discussing the setting of the arraignment, the prosecutor noted, 
"There's that issue of the detainer. I would like to keep this 
moving along as best we can. The earlier we can get in to see 
Judge Boydon [sic] the better" (R. 255:94). The arraignment 
was set for February 11 (R. 30). 
Feb. 11,2002 At the arraignment, the prosecutor filed a motion and supporting 
memorandum for a joint trial with dual juries (R. 31-39). 
Because both defendants had different counsel from LDA, and 
the co-defendant had given evidence against Houston, conflict 
counsel became necessary (R. 31 -32). The prosecutor explained 
that the motion was prompted because "both defendants have 
filed detainers. Thus, severance is not an option because any 
3 
delay seriously jeopardizes the State's ability to try both cases." 
(R. 32). The prosecutor explained that he suggested the dual 
jury procedure because "dual juries would save the case from 
dismissal through [the] detainer If the cases are severed as 
a result of the Bruton problem, the State will likely be unable to 
prosecute both cases within the 120-day window. Thus, one or 
both cases may be dismissed. The dual jury procedure solves 
this problem." (R. 35). The minutes reflect, "on defense 
motion, conflict counsel to be appointed" (R. 259). The matter 
was continued to February 25 (R. 260-62).2 
Feb. 25, 2002 The trial court set the three-day jury trial for March 13 through 
15—sixteen days away (R. 260-61). 
Feb. 27, 2002 The prosecutor provided written notice of its expert witnesses 
(R. 41-42). Br.ofAplt.at31,n.31. 
Mar. 8, 2002 The prosecutor filed a list of proposed witnesses at trial which 
included experts (R. 47-49). He also filed a motion in limine 
seeking to have the court admit the DNA testing results 
involving blood from the victim and each co-defendant as well 
as blood found on the victim's clothing and a wall near the 
scene of the crime (R. 50-59). 
Mar. 11, 2002 A pretrial conference was held at which defendant objected to 
the State's proposed expert witnesses because the State failed to 
give defendant thirty days' notice as required by statute (R. 272: 
5-7, 15-16). Add. B. Defendant noted that the appropriate 
remedy would be continuance, which would extend the matter 
beyond the detainer period, or exclusion of the evidence, which 
would permit trial in two days as scheduled (R. 272: 6). The 
prosecutor emphasized that the appropriate remedy was a 
continuance, and that the continuance should not be deducted 
from the detainer period (R. 272: 4). The trial judge ruled that 
she would not suppress or exclude the DNA evidence where the 
setting of the trial only sixteen days after the arraignment left the 
State unable to meet the thirty-day notice requirement for its 
2The case against the co-defendant apparently was later reassigned to another 
judge, and the State's motion for a dual jury was stricken (R. 272: 15). 
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expert witnesses, and the prosecutor submitted the notice within 
two days of trial being set (R. 272: 13-14; R. 41-42) (the ruling 
is attached in Addendum E). The court left it to defendant to 
decide whether a continuance would be necessary to permit him 
to meet the expert testimony and have a fair trial (R. 272: 17-
18). Defendant objected to the situation, but chose the 
continuance (R. 272: 18). The trial court ruled that the 
continuance was "technically" granted to the State due to its 
failure to comply with the thirty-day notice requirement, and 
noted that defendant did not waive his statutory speedy trial 
right (R. 272: 17-18). Add. E. 
However, in attempting to reschedule the trial, problems arose 
between defense counsel's availability and the trial court's 
calendar (R. 272: 18-19). Add. E. The court attempted to set 
the date inside the detainer period, but defense counsel was 
unavailable (R. 272: 18-19). The judge then offered her next 
available date of April 24, 25, and 26, with the judge expressly 
noting that those days were past the disposition period (R. 272: 
20-21). Add.E. 
Mar. 19, 2002 The prosecutor filed a motion and supporting memorandum, 
asking the court to reconsider its finding that the fourteen-day 
delay occasioned by defendant's need to obtain conflict counsel 
should have been attributed to defendant and should have tolled 
the detainer period (R. 84-91).3 
3The record contains no evidence of a ruling on this motion. At the April 22 
pretrial hearing, defense counsel made the following comment: 
I think I know where we are going with this [discussion of 
responsibility for earlier delays]. We talked about this basically the last 
time we were here when the State had filed a Motion to Reconsider, I guess, 
the reason for the continuance the second time. So we know what the likely 
ruling will be. . . . 
(R. 272: 3). The only other evidence of a hearing after the State filed its motion on March 
19 is a mention in the docket of a hearing on April 1 (R. 220). No minutes or explanation 
of the content of that hearing appear in the record. 
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Apr. 12, 2002 The final day of the original, uninterrupted 120-day detainer 
period as believed by the trial court and the parties (R. 271: 6; 
R. 272: 18). Br. of Aplt. at 16-17. Add. C. 
Apr. 18, 2002 Defendant filed a motion and supporting memorandum to 
dismiss the charge against him, alleging a violation of his 
statutory speedy trial rights (R. 143-48). 
Apr. 22, 2002 A pretrial conference occurred, at which the trial court heard 
argument on the earlier delays caused by the need for conflict 
counsel and the inadequate notice provided for the State's expert 
witnesses (R. 271: 1-8). The court then ruled that it would not 
attribute the delays to either party but that both delays warranted 
reasonable continuances under the circumstances (R. 271:7-8) 
(the ruling is attached in Addendum E). The court also denied 
defendant's motion to dismiss (R. 271: 8). Add. E. 
The prosecutor submitted at the April 22 hearing proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law which correctly reflected 
the trial court's verbal rulings on the various delays and the 
scheduling of the trial (R. 271:8-9; R. 133-36) (the document is 
attached in Addendum F). These findings were never signed 
{id.). 
Apr. 24, 2002 Trial began (R. 248). 
Apr. 26, 2002 Following a three-day trial, the jury found defendant guilty of 
aggravated robbery, but did not find that he had used a knife in 
the crime (R. 205-06). 
July 1,2002 Defendant was sentenced to five-years-to-life in the Utah State 
Prison, with the sentence to run consecutively with the time he 
was then serving in prison (R. 226-27). 
July 9,2002 Defendant timely submitted a notice of appeal (R. 228-29) 
Aug. 27, 2002 The Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court (R. 
251). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The particular facts of defendant's crimes are not relevant to determination of the 
issues on appeal. However, they are briefly summarized for the reader's information. 
On October 23,2001, the victim, Rafael Duran, and a friend went to Sociables, a bar 
in Salt Lake City (R. 256: 105-06). He carried with him his cell phone together with a 
sizeable amount of money in his wallet (R. 256: 107-08). 
Duran's money eventually came to the attention of defendant and Gabriel Valenzuela 
(R. 256: 136). They decided to rob Duran (R. 256: 137). While at the bar, Duran lent his 
cell phone to someone, and it was passed around to several other people who made calls on 
it (R. 256:12). Duran attempted to keep tabs on his phone and eventually noticed defendant 
walk outside with it (R. 256: 123-24, 127). When he did not return, Duran went outside to 
get it (R. 256: 113). 
Duran never knew what hit him, and was unconscious for approximately two weeks 
(R. 255: 10-11). He was discovered shortly after the attack by bar patrons who called 911 
(R. 257: 221-22). He had suffered two knife cuts on his back, three on his upper chest, one 
on his left forearm, and one on his left arm (R. 257: 210). He had also suffered a severe head 
injury and had undergone surgery to relieve the bleeding on his brain (R. 257:210,216). His 
wallet and cell phone were never located (R. 256: 115). 
Bar patrons were instrumental in identifying a truck seen speeding from the scene, 
defendant, and Valenzuela, his co-defendant (R. 258:420-22; R. 257:222-23,238-44; R. 256: 
162-65; State's Exh. 25). Police later obtained the truck, which was registered to defendant 
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(R. 258: 425; R. 257: 236). Defendant was found to have a large, fresh cut between his right 
thumb and forefinger (State's Exh. 21). The police took blood samples from several places, 
including the scene of the attack, the victim's clothing, the inside and outside of defendant's 
truck, as well as from defendant (R. 257: 251-59,262-66,278-83,287-88,293-94, 308-23). 
DNA testing provided a match between the scene of the crime, the victim's clothing, and 
defendant (R. 257: 351-52). 
Defendant and Mr. Valenzuela were charged as co-defendants (R. 3-5). Mr. 
Valenzuela later testified against defendant (R. 133-51). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court need not reach any of defendant' s three arguments because, even assuming 
defendant would prevail on the merits of his claims and the total amount of the delays should 
not toll the running of the 120-day disposition period, the final trial setting was supported by 
"good cause" under the speedy trial statute because it was necessary to accommodate defense 
counsel's schedule. Because the original trial date was set for only sixteen days after the 
arraignment, the prosecutor was not able to provide defendant with the statutory thirty days' 
notice of the expert witnesses he intended to use at trial. At the pretrial conference on March 
11, the trial judge determined that a trial continuance was necessary to permit defendant the 
full amount of notice and, hence, a fair trial. The trial court offered to set the trial during the 
first week of April, which would have permitted defendant the full notice period as well as 
allowed the trial to occur within the original detainer period. The only reason the trial was 
not set for this period was because defense counsel was going to be out of town. The next 
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available date on the court's calendar for a felony jury trial was April 24—eleven days 
beyond the actual end of the original detainer period.4 Extending the disposition period 
beyond the 120-day period to accommodate defense counsel's schedule constitutes "good 
cause" under the detainer statute. The trial court therefore properly scheduled the trial for 
its next available date beyond April 13 and correctly denied defendant's motion to dismiss. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS BECAUSE THE RESCHEDULING OF THE TRIAL 
BEYOND THE DETAINER PERIOD TO THE COURT'S NEXT 
AVAILABLE DATE WAS DONE TO ACCOMMODATE DEFENSE 
COUNSEL'S SCHEDULE, PROVIDING "GOOD CAUSE" UNDER 
THE DETAINER STATUTE 
A. Introduction 
Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss, arguing that the 
trial court erroneously considered "reasonableness" in determining the existence of "good 
cause" for delays of the detainer period, and that the court ignored its responsibility to 
attribute all delays to one party or the other in order to determine whether to toll the detainer 
4Defendant claims that the original, uninterrupted detainer period ended on April 
12, 2002. Br. of Aplt. at 16-17. However, properly counted according to this Court's 
decision in State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, % 6, n.7, the period actually would have 
ended on April 13. See Argument, section A, infra. 
9 
period found in Utah Code Ann. § 11-29A (1999), Utah's intrastate speedy trial statute.5 
This provision, which outlines defendant's statutory speedy trial right, provides: 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state 
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is 
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information, 
and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in 
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying 
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting 
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge 
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice. 
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand 
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be 
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to 
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk 
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the 
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in 
open court . . . may be granted any reasonable continuance. 
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or 
within such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel 
moves to dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court 
finds that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard 
within the time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous 
motion for continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter 
dismissed with prejudice. 
(Emphasis added). Add. B. The purpose of section 77-29-1 is "to protect the constitutional 
right of prisoners to a speedy trial and to prevent those charged with enforcement of criminal 
5Although defendant mentions his constitutional right to a speedy trial (Br. of Aplt. 
at 2-3, 34), his arguments below and on appeal pertain solely to his state statutory right. 
Accordingly, this Court need only address the statutory right. See, e.g., State v. Hovater, 
914 P.2d 37, 39 n.l (Utah 1996), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Litherland, 2000 
UT 76, 12 P.3d 92; State v. Webb, 119 P.2d 1108, 1111 n.4 (Utah 1989). 
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statutes from holding over the head of a prisoner undisposed charges against him." State v. 
Trujillo, 656 P.2d 403, 404-05 (Utah 1982) (citing State v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115 (Utah 
1982) and referencing the purpose of the predecessor speedy trial statute); accord State v. 
Viles, 702 P.2d 1175, 1176 (Utah 1985) (stating the purpose of section 77-29-1 in similar 
terms); see also State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361, 362, 453 P.2d 158, 159 (1969) (citing the 
purpose of the predecessor statute). 
The statute outlines the responsibilities of both parties in bringing about a speedy 
resolution of charges. While the prosecution carries the ultimate burden of bringing the 
matter to trial within 120 days of the filing of a disposition request, defendant has the 
threshold burden of ensuring that the statute is properly invoked. See State v. Heaton, 958 
P.2d 911, 915-16 (Utah 1998) (when a prisoner delivers a written notice pursuant to the 
statute, then the prosecutor has an affirmative duty to have the matter heard in 120 days, 
which does not start until notice is properly delivered under the statute); State v. Petersen, 
810 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1991) (describing the prosecutor's burden); State v. Wright, 745 
P.2d 447,450-51 (Utah 1987) (the request must be appropriately sent to the right people and 
contain an appropriate demand in order to be effective); Viles, 702 P.2d at 1175 (the burden 
is on the prisoner to give proper notice before being entitled to have charges disposed of in 
the statutory period); Wilson, 453 P.2d at 160 (describing the prosecutor's burden). Once a 
defendant has properly invoked the statute to start the 120-day period running, thereby 
shifting the burden to the prosecution to ensure a timely trial, defendant must not unduly 
11 
delay matters or the delay may be charged against him and the 120-day period extended. See 
/feflfofl,958P.2dat916. 
"[W]hether the district court properly denied [a defendant's] motion to dismiss 
pursuant to the detainer [or speedy trial] statute requires a two-step inquiry." State v. 
Wagenman, 2003 UT App 146, % 8,473 Utah Adv. Rep. 57 (quotation and emphasis omitted, 
alterations in original). "First, we must determine when the 120 day period commenced and 
when it expired. Second, if the trial was held beyond the 120 day period, we must then 
determine whether 'good cause' excused the delay." Id. (quoting State v. Lindsay, 2000 UT 
App 379, f 9,18 P.3d 504 (additional citation omitted)). If no good cause excused the delay, 
then the "court shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice." Wagenman, 2002 UT App 
146,19 (quoting Utah Code Ann. 77-29-1(4)); see also Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916-17 (noting 
that good cause excuses non-compliance with the statute). 
In this case, the parties and the trial court relied on the prison's receipt of the 
disposition request on December 14, 2001, as the start of the 120-day detainer period (R. 
271: 6; R. 272:18). Defendant accepts this point on appeal. Br. of Aplt. at 16-17. However, 
this Court has determined that the 120-day period commences the day following the date 
stamped on the disposition request as the date the prison received the notice. See State v. 
Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, K 6 n.7, 34 P.3d 790, cert denied, 42 P.3d 951 (Utah 2002). 
Accordingly, the first day of the detainer period would be December 15, 2001, and the last 
day of the uninterrupted 120-day detainer period in this case would be April 13, 2002, not 
April 12. See Add. C. The trial was scheduled to begin on April 24—eleven days beyond 
12 
the end of the original, uninterrupted 120-day period. Hence, the question is whether "good 
cause" existed to extend the 120 days beyond April 13. See Wagenman, 2003 UT App 146, 
118. 
"Good cause" means: "(1) delay caused by the defendant—such as asking for a 
continuance; or (2) 'a relatively short delay caused by unforseen problems arising 
immediately prior to trial.'" Coleman, 2001 UT App 281,1f 6 (quoting Petersen, 810 P.2d 
at 426 (footnote omitted)); see also Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916 ("when a prisoner himself acts 
to delay the trial, he indicates his willingness to temporarily waive his right to a speedy 
trial"); State v. Banner, 111 P.2d 1325, 1329-30 (Utah 1986) (defendant's delay of a trial 
constitutes a temporary waiver of his statutory right to a speedy trial); Velasquez, 641 P.2d 
at 116 (same under predecessor statute); accord State v. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001, 
1004-05 (Utah App. 1993). 
B. The Relevant Record 
The rescheduling of the trial beyond the detainer period occurred at the pretrial 
conference on March 11, 2002. The prosecutor raised the issue of his late notice of expert 
witnesses, explained why he was unable to provide a full thirty days' notice, and 
acknowledged that defendant would be entitled to seek a continuance for the remainder of 
the thirty-day period in order to meet the expert testimony (R. 272:4-5).6 Defendant wanted 
6The prosecutor assured the trial court that the reports of the DNA expert and the 
serologist were "handed to defense counsel at the preliminary hearing]" and that the 
medical records were sent as part of the "initial discovery" (R. 272: 9-10). It was only the 
curriculum vitae and the notice that were sent on February 27, completing the information 
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to proceed with the March 13 trial, but only upon exclusion of the State's expert testimony 
(R. 272: 8). The trial judge then explained her understanding of the issue before her: 
All right. This is clearly something that does require some balancing 
on the Court's part because we have almost what would appear to be 
conflicting rights—not conflicting, but rights that the defendant does enjoy 
that the Court is going to do everything I can to make sure that you have the 
timely trial on this matter, but at the same time it needs to be a fair and just 
trial. And if your counsel cannot go forward on this week's setting because 
they do not have the information that they need, then it may very well be that 
the interests of justice dictate that, in order for you, Mr. Houston, to have a fair 
trial, that it needs to be delayed. 
That then raises the issue that you have made, the detainer. But the 
detainer is not so absolute that the Court cannot take into consideration all of 
those issues and all of these balancing issues. 
While the defendant has not requested continuances, the fact is, there 
needs to be a delay because there was a conflict in the Legal Defender's office 
with counsel and there needed to be an appointment of counsel and that caused 
a delay. In fact, those are the delays that have been involved in this court 
before me, because it was not bound over to me until after the January 24th 
preliminary hearing bindover. It was immediately set on my calendar in a 
timely fashion for the arraignment; and then that was continued. So we do 
have continuances here. 
It's not particularly important that I call them either defense or State's 
except that we do have the 120-day disposition request. And so I need to make 
sure that I am not granting more time than is appropriate because the defendant 
has not requested it, and I, in fact, did set the jury trial on March 13th, 14th and 
15th. 
Those dates are still available. The Court is still scheduled to do that. 
Apparently the State is still ready to go forward but has not given the 
defendant the 30-day notice required by law on the expert witnesses]. 
required by statute to be given to defendant (R. 272: 10). None of the experts testified at 
the preliminary hearing. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(5) (1999). 
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That I now need to take into consideration. More than just saying, Do 
you wish your notice or not, if it's something that Mr. Houston feels he cannot 
be prepared to go to trial on March 13th, 14th and 15th because he has not 
received the substance of those reports and cannot prepare adequately for cross 
examination—and again, I am not characterizing this one way or another as a 
defense request or a State request—I need to be able to weigh the interests of 
justice here and determine whether or not I am denying Mr. Houston a right 
to a fair trial by requiring him to go forward this week if the defense doesn't 
feel that they have had adequate time to prepare for cross examination of 
expert witnesses. That's the only question. I'm not saying that it will then be 
counted as your continuance request. 
(R. 272: 10-12). Add. E. 
Defendant objected to the court's characterization of the situation and continued to 
seek exclusion of the expert testimony because of the lack of adequate notice (R. 272:12-13). 
Add. E. The court responded: 
All right. Then I will rule on that issue then, that I am not going to 
suppress the DNA results simply because the notice has not been met. The 
requirements that the State provide that notice are in place. But the fact that 
it was bound over on January 24th at a preliminary hearing, there was no jury 
trial date set, and I do not feel that it warrants suppression of the evidence 
because they did not provide that notice at the bindover date. 
The arraignment date on February 11th was continued to February 25th. 
And the February 25th date was when it was scheduled for jury trial, and that 
is the date that I'm going for.[7] So I am not going to suppress the evidence 
itself because the 30-day notice requirement was not given from the January 
24th hearing. . . . To exclude it. . . . And that is a more accurate 
characterization. So I am denying the motion to exclude. 
(R. 272: 13-14). Add. E. The trial court also included the remaining expert testimony at 
issue in its ruling (R. 272: 14). Add. E. 
7Defendant agrees that the official notice of expert witnesses was filed two days 
after the trial date was set—on February 27 (R. 41-42; R. 272: 5-6). Br. of Aplt. at 35-38. 
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Defendant declared that he could not proceed to trial as scheduled without the 
statutory notice (R. 272:16). Add. E. He refused to request a continuance, but agreed that 
the trial must be rescheduled (id.). Add. E. The trial judge then explained her position: 
And I just want to clarify my ruling a little bit. 
It is true that I have ruled that I will not exclude the testimony or the 
expert witnesses based on the noncompliance with the 30 days because I just 
simply did not find the bad faith necessary in the failure to comply with the 30-
day notice. The State has done it as quickly as they can in the trial setting. 
And so by not excluding the testimony, or excluding the witnesses I guess, by 
default, I guess that means I am granting the continuance and it is to the 
requesting party. 
What I asked the defendant then was, based on the fact that there is 
currently before me a 120-day disposition, I needed to have the input as to 
whether or not the defendant felt he could be prepared to go forward so that, 
even though the remedy I have provided and the remedy that is provided by 
statute is a continuance for the proponent party, I wanted the input as to 
whether or not the defendant felt that he could have a fair trial and be 
adequately prepared. That is the answer that Mr. Mack [defense counsel] has 
given me today after consulting with both his client, Mr. Houston, and with the 
office. And they do not feel that they can be fairly prepared for the series of 
charges without having more time to examine the testimony which I have not 
excluded. 
The continuance, therefore, I guess, technically, is being granted to the 
State because they have not provided, technically, the 30-day notice and they 
do need to do that. But the issue before me, which was more important to me, 
is just the granting of a fair and timely trial for Mr. Houston. [8] 
The 120-day disposition date, my understanding, after reviewing the 
calendar with both Mr. Mack and Mr. Burmester [the prosecutor], is April 12th. 
8At a later hearing, the trial court noted and rejected defendant's argument—set 
forth on appeal—that the prosecutor should have complied with the notice requirement as 
early as the preliminary hearing, even though the case had not been bound over, the 
parties had not appeared before this judge, and a trial date had not been set (R. 271: 7). 
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We can do what flexibility we need to set that during that time frame [sic]. 
The defendant is not waiving that 120-day request. 
Again, I know that there are other issues that I need to balance that 
against. And I will set it as quickly as we can, but we are to the March 11th 
date. That puts it within a month. I do have several other jurys that are set, 
many of them in custody, and I'll throw out some dates and see what we can 
[do]. Whether or not that can be before April 12th is another issue. 
(R. 272: 17-18). Add. E. 
During the discussion of potential trial dates which followed the judge's explanation, 
the trial judge determined that the last day of the required thirty-day notice period was the 
end of March (R. 272: 20). Add. E. The judge offered to free the court's calendar to set the 
felony jury trial the first week of April, within the original, uninterrupted detainer period (R. 
272: 18-19). Defense counsel stated that he could not do it that week because he was to be 
out of town for all but one day of that week (R. 272: 18-19). Add. E. The parties discussed 
the next available date of April 24, and the judge explained: 
All right. Let's set this for April 24, 25 and 26. And the record will 
reflect that that is past the 120-day disposition. The Court knows that as we 
are doing it and it's past the 30 days for the expert-witness notice. But it is the 
soonest I can set it on the calendar, given that the defense counsel is not going 
to be here the first week of April and the [weeks of the] 8th and 15th are master 
calendars for the Court. And I don't have the flexibility of setting during those 
weeks, so I am setting them the next available date that I have for a felony jury 
[trial]. 
(R. 272: 20-21). Add. E. 
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C. Defense Counsel's Scheduling Conflict Provides "Good Cause" For Rescheduling 
The Trial Beyond The Detainer Period 
Defendant claims three periods of delay, arguing that they should not toll the detainer 
period: 1) the prison's refusal to transport defendant to court for the second day of what was 
anticipated to be a one-day preliminary hearing, which resulted in a seven-day delay in 
completing the hearing9; 2) the State's motion for a joint trial with dual juries, which 
allegedly prompted a fourteen-day delay to obtain conflict counsel for one defendant10; and 
3) the prosecutor's inadequate notice of expert witnesses, which allegedly prompted a forty-
two day delay in the trial setting. Br. of Aplt. at 18-41. The trial court did not address the 
prison's delay, but determined that the need for conflict counsel and the need to provide a 
full thirty days' notice of the expert witnesses required reasonable continuances under the 
detainer statute (R. 271: 5; R. 272: 5-7). 
Rather than reviewing all of defendant's claims and the trial court's multiple rulings 
thereon, this Court need only address the question of whether the setting of the trial date 
9The trial court did not toll the period for this first period, even though the need for 
a second day to complete the preliminary hearing was caused, in part, by the schedule of 
one of the defense counsel, thereby providing "good cause" for rescheduling the hearing. 
Cf.9 Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917. 
10Defendant fails to recognize that once the co-defendant decided to testify against 
defendant, conflict counsel would need to be appointed anyway. Counsel for the co-
defendant recognized as much because, at the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, he 
informed the prosecutor that he needed to conflict out of the case (R. 271: 3-4). The 
prosecutor filed its motion thereafter only because the change of attorneys had not 
occurred, and he did not want further delay to cause dismissal of the case against either 
defendant, both of whom had filed disposition requests (R. 35; R. 271: 4). 
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beyond the detainer period to accommodate defense counsel's schedule constitutes "good 
cause" under the detainer statute. The record clearly shows that the trial would have been 
set within the original uninterrupted 120-day period but for defense counsel's 
unavailability.11 The three-day trial was set for the next available setting on the trial court's 
calendar for a felony jury trial, extending it beyond the end of the original detainer period. 
See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916 (Utah 1998) ("this court may affirm a trial court's decision on 
any reasonable legal basis, provided that any rationale for affirmance finds support in the 
record."); Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, f 14, n.9. 
"[EJxtending the trial date to a reasonable time outside the disposition period to 
accommodate, in part, defense counsel's schedule constitutes 'good cause' under section 77-
29-1(3) and (4)[.]" Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917; see also State v. Bonny, All P.2d 147,148 (Utah 
llThe prosecutor raised the issue below in his Motion to Reconsider Finding[s], 
filed March 19, 2002 (R. 89-90). Findings and conclusions on this point were included in 
the unsigned Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 133-36). Add. F. The record 
undeniably reflects the facts relevant to defense counsel's schedule as stated herein, even 
though the only mention made by the trial court of the scheduling problem was brief: 
. . . The resetting [of the trial] was done as quickly as we could. 
A number of days were discussed and this was the first day that we 
could get all parties here, so the April 24th date, which is scheduled this 
week and which is apparently going forward, is a reasonable date as the 
court calendar and every other circumstance could be taken into 
consideration, if I find that it was not unreasonable to delay it because of 
the expert witness issue and the conflict of counsel issue. I find both of 
those reasons good [cause] for delay, so I am denying Mr. Houston's 
Motion to Dismiss because it was not held within the 120 days. 
(R.271:8). Add.E. 
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1970) (setting the trial outside the statutory period to accommodate defense counsel's 
schedule was "entirely reasonable and practical"). 
The Utah Supreme Court's ruling in Heaton is dispositive of defendant's appeal. In 
Heaton, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the propriety of a trial setting outside the detainer 
period because of a conflict with defense counsel's schedule. Id. at 917. The date initially 
offered by the trial court in that case was within the disposition period, but both the 
prosecutor and defense counsel were involved in another criminal trial on that date, requiring 
that the trial be set at the next available date, one month beyond the disposition period. Id. 
The supreme court determined that the second setting "was not unreasonable" in light of the 
situation, and expressly held that, while there may have been error in some of the trial court's 
legal conclusions, "extending the trial date to a reasonable time outside the disposition period 
to accommodate, impart, defense counsel's schedule constitutes 'good cause' under section 
77-29-1(3) and (4), and the trial court correctly denied Heaton's motion to dismiss." Id. 
(emphasis added). In other words, the fact that the prosecutor bore partial responsibility for 
setting the trial date outside the disposition period did not prevent the four-week delay in the 
trial setting from being "reasonable" under the detainer statute. 
Defendant addresses the scheduling conflict at two points in his brief, acknowledging 
the basic record facts, apportioning responsibility for the delay to the court and the 
prosecutor, and arguing, without mention of legal authority, that he should bear no 
responsibility for the delay beyond the disposition period because his schedule became 
relevant only because of the State's failure to give full notice of its expert witnesses. Br. of 
20 
Aplt. at 31 n.31, 40-41. Although the expert witness notice was the reason for having to 
reschedule the trial, it was not the reason for scheduling the trial outside of the 120-day 
detainer period. The trial could have been set within the original, uninterrupted detainer 
period but for defense counsel's schedule. The court calendar permitted it, nothing suggests 
that the prosecutor was unavailable, and the sole reason the matter was not timely set the first 
week of April was because defense counsel was unavailable. Accordingly, the rescheduling 
of the trial date outside the original disposition period to the next available date because of 
defense counsel's schedule constitutes "good cause" under the detainer statute, and the trial 
court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this C ^ T ^ y o f July, 2003. 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
IS C. LEONAI 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Titles 76 and 77 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be uin the 
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a 
robbery. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-302, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-302; 1975, ch. 51, § 1; 







Titles 76 and 77 
77-29-1. Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending 
charge — Duties of custodial officer — Continu-
ance may be granted — Dismissal of charge for 
failure to bring to trial. 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state 
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is 
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or informa-
tion, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in 
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying 
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting 
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge 
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice. 
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand 
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be 
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to 
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or 
custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified, 
provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of commit-
ment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested. 
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the 
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in 
open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any 
reasonable continuance. 
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within 
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to 
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that 
the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the 
time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for 
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with 
prejudice. 
History: <\ 1963, 77-29-1, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, $ 2. 
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'A-IA. .* 4J.N. 1 1 U 
NOTICE AND REQUEST FOR DISPOSITION OF PENDING CHARGE(S) llfa/tl 
TO: DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONS 
Notice is hereby given that I, £,( y,A^ \ ^oLi^r^ ^  _ 
(Inmate Name)do hereby request final disposition. Charge(s) of 
pending ag^nst me in the ^ U U b c i U ^<A A. yi/.r-f Court, 
brought by Q a W Uvt^ CIX...VKA (prosecuting 
agency e.g., county, city, Attorney General, etc. in the State of 
Utah) and request is hereby made that you forward this notice to 
the appropriate authorities together with such information as 
required by law. 
Dated this ^ day of Dc c IC\ (Month / Year) . 
Inmate's Namec^/^s/ ^ ^ t / c / X USP# '2L^^/S J 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • * * * * * ^ 
I hereby certify that I have received a copy of the foregoing 
notice this V day of *y.iZ- .^ Lr: (Month / Year) . 
/,IJL<:L-(L /I ^ / u ^ 
Authorized Agent, DIO Record Unit 
USP, PO Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020 




'\$£$$ r DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
^'77;f'f \ DIVISION OF INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONS 
hael O. Leavitt . 
Governor ? 
Mike Chabries j 
Executive Director f PO Box 250 
Scott V. Carver f Draper UT 84020 
Division Director ' (801)576-7000 
14 December 2001 
Salt Lake City Prosecuting Attorney 
2001 S State #S3400 
SLC,UT 84109-1200 
RE: HOUSTON, Richard Dale 
U.S.P.# 28987 DOB 11/08/79 
YOUR CASE #011918410 
Dear Sirs: 
MR/MRS/MS Richard Dale Houston is currently incarcerated in the Utah State Prison. 
He/She is requesting disposition of untried charges of Aggravated Robbery, pending in 
your jurisdiction. Enclosed is the appropriate paperwork to process his request. 
Thank you for your assistance with this matter. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Scott Carver, Director 
of Institutional Operations 
by: Alberta Smith 
Records/Office Tech III 
End. (2) 
cc: Third District Court Clerk 
Inmate File 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
CERTIFICATE OF INMATE STATUS 
120-DAY DISPOSITION 
TO: Third District Court Clerk 
RE: HOUSTON, Richard Dale 28987 
Inmate Name USP# 
TERM of COMMITMENT: Theft by Receiving Stolen Property 1-15 yrs. 
Discharge Firearm from Vehicle/Highway 0-5 
yrs, Poss/Purchase Dangerous Weapon-
Restricted 0-5 yrs. 
TIME SERVED: Approx 02 year(s) 03mo 
TIME REMAINING: Approx. 12 year(s) 09 mo 
**time calculated may not include toll time/credit time served** 
PAROLE ELIGIBILITY:scheduled for parole 00/00/00 
BOARD OF PARDONS Hearing set for 00/00/00 
DECISION: 
Mr. Scott Carver, Director 
Institutional Operations 
Authorized Agent, DIO Record Unit 
Utah State Prison 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) 
P l a i n t i f f , ) C a s e No. 011918410 
v s . ) T r a n s c r i p t o f : 
RICHARD DALE HOUSTON, ) PRETRIAL CONFERENCE 
1 . . ! II 1 . f 1 
1 D e f e n d a n t . ) 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE ANN BOYDEN 
SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE 
450 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-1860 r-.'J >-* . 
UtanO_- . 
Pcufetts :*_ 
CJertccfiJry. .',.- \ 
MARCH 1 1 , 2002 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
FEB 2 6 2003 
/S// SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 1 
REPORTED BY: SUZANNE WARNICK, RDR, CSR 
2 3 8 - 7 5 2 9 
counsel at the prelim, at least by the second day of the 
prelim. 
The way it worked, we had the initial day, the 22nd, 
and we tried to continue it to the next day because of the 
detainer because we couldn't quite finish it in time. And the 
prison couldn't transport on a one-day notice, so we showed up 
in court and that's when I handed those reports, because I 
received the DNA report the afternoon of the 22nd. So those 
reports were handed to him. 
I thought that the physician's — the medical 
records were part of initial discovery. If defense counsel 
doesn't have them somewhere — he should have had them. We've 
had them all along and they should have received them. 
The CV and the notice were generated the week trial 
was set in this court. It wasn't the next day but it seems 
like it was by the end of that week that we got them out. If 
that was last week — I can't remember. 
MR. MACK: The week of the 25th. 
THE COURT: Which was the 25th when that was dated. 
All right. This is clearly something that does 
require some balancing on the Court's part because we have 
almost what would appear to be conflicting rights -- not 
conflicting, but rights that the defendant does enjoy that the 
Court is going to do everything I can to make sure that you 
have the timely trial on this matter, but at the same time it 
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needs to be a fair and just trial. And if your counsel cannot 
go forward on this week's setting because they do not have the 
information that they need, then it may very well be that the 
interests of justice dictate that, in order for you, 
Mr. Houston, to have a fair trial, that it needs to be 
delayed• 
That then raises the issue that you have made, the 
detainer. But the detainer is not so absolute that the Court 
cannot take into consideration all of those issues and all of 
these balancing issues. 
While the defendant has not requested continuances, 
the fact is, there needs to be a delay because there was a 
conflict in the Legal Defender's office with counsel and there 
needed to be an appointment of counsel and that caused a 
delay. In fact, those are the delays that have been involved 
in this court before me, because it was not bound over to me 
until after the January 24th preliminary hearing bindover. It 
was immediately set on my calendar in a timely fashion for the 
arraignment; and then that was continued. So we do have 
continuances here. 
It's not particularly important that I call them 
either defense or State's except that we do have the 120-day 
disposition request. And so I need to make sure that I am not 
granting more time than is appropriate because the defendant 
has not requested it, and I, in fact, did set the jury trial 
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on March 13th, 14th and 15th. 
Those dates are still available. The Court is still 
scheduled to do that. Apparently the State is still ready to 
go forward but has not given the defendant the 30-day notice 
required by law on the expert witness. 
That I now need to take into consideration. More 
than just saying, Do you wish your notice or not, if it's 
something that Mr. Houston feels he cannot be prepared to go 
to trial on March 13th, 14th and 15th because he has not 
received the substance of those reports and cannot prepare 
adequately for cross examination — and again, I am not 
characterizing this one way or another as a defense request or 
a State request — I need to be able to weigh the interests of 
justice here and determine whether or not I am denying 
Mr. Houston a right to a fair trial by requiring him to go 
forward this week if the defense doesn't feel that they have 
had adequate time to prepare for cross examination of expert 
witnesses. That's the only question. I'm not saying that it 
will then be counted as your continuance request. 
MR. MACK: But, Judge, I don't think that frames it. 
We don't agree with the framing on that. We are ready to go 
to trial on Wednesday. But we don't believe the State should 
be allowed, since they failed to comply with the notice 
requirement, to use expert witnesses. 
So we need to know, first, the Court's inclination 
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on whether the State can use those people or not, given their 
failure to comply. It's not that we1re not ready to go to 
trial. We want this date. That's the question. And he's not 
willing to waive the failure to comply with the notice 
requirement. 
THE COURT: With as many motions as I do have from 
the State, I do not have before me even a motion to suppress 
the expert evidence because the notice requirement has not 
been complied with. That's really what we have been 
addressing today, but I don't have that motion as well. We'll 
leave these up and have those be motions in limine I guess is 
what we have. 
MR. MACK: I think it's a response to the State's 
motion to admit these DNA testing results, Judge. That's not 
all that that motion is about. 
THE COURT: So are you objecting to the admission of 
the DNA testing results because you did not get the notice or 
for other reasons as well? 
MR. MACK: I think, first of all, because it's 
improperly noticed. 
THE COURT: All right. Then I will rule on that 
issue then, that I am not going to suppress the DNA results 
simply because the notice has not been met. The requirements 
that the State provide that notice are in place. But the fact 
that it was bound over on January 24th at a preliminary 
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hearing, there was no jury trial date set, and I do not feel 
that it warrants suppression of the evidence because they did 
not provide that notice at the bindover date. 
The arraignment date on February 11th was continued 
to February 25th. And the February 25th date was when it was 
scheduled for jury trial, and that is the date that I'm going 
for. So I am not going to suppress the evidence itself 
because the 30-day notice requirement was not given from the 
January 24th hearing. 
MR. MACK: Maybe I misspoke on my request, Judge. I 
think it would be a request to exclude it, not to suppress it. 
THE COURT: To exclude it. Oh, all right. And that 
is a more accurate characterization. So I am denying the 
motion to exclude. 
MR. MACK: Can we read into that that you would also 
not exclude the doctor1s statement, Swen Swensen, and the 
serologist Gabriel Bier's testimony for the same reason? 
THE COURT: Not based on a lack-of-notice 
requirement• 
MR. MACK: Could we just have a short recess, Judge? 
I would like to consult with my office about whether we want 
to still keep this date this week or if it's in Mr. Houston's 
interest to have it rescheduled. 
THE COURT: Certainly. That is appropriate at this 
time. And we will recess on this case and handle some of the 
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other matters on my calendar this morning and we'll address 
the Houston matter later. 
MR. BURMESTER: Your Honor, may I be excused to go to 
a different court for a moment and handle a different case? 
THE COURT: You may. We'll need both attorneys 
obviously and Mr. Houston later on in the morning. 
(Off the record.) 
THE COURT: Are we in a position to deal with the 
Houston matters? 
MR. MACK: We are, Judge. 
THE COURT: Let's bring Mr. Houston out then. 
Mr. Burmester, you are the last one on my list 
today. 
Also, for the record, I am striking the motion for a 
dual jury since that's out now. 
(The defendant is brought into the courtroom.) 
THE COURT: Mr. Houston is back in the courtroom with 
Mr. Mack. 
What else do we need to address? 
MR. MACK; Well, Judge, when we were last on the 
record, we were talking about how to proceed with this case. 
This trial is set for Wednesday of this week. Our objection 
was that the State's failure to comply with the expert notice 
requirement mandates -- well, our request was that the 
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witnesses be excluded. 
The Court's ruling was that, not for reasons of the 
State's — well, let me restate that. The Court's ruling, if 
I understand it, was that you were not going to exclude that 
evidence based on their failure to comply with the notice 
requirement. That then bought us to the discussion of whether 
we could go ahead on Wednesday with the trial. 
We can't. We're not prepared to confront those 
witnesses. But we would like to state again for the record 
that we feel that the remedies available to the Court are 
either exclusion or a continuance. The Court has indicated 
neither of those options but that the State can proceed with 
those witnesses on the date that's scheduled this week. 
I consulted with my office about the ramifications 
of that, whether that would hurt any appeal rights of 
Mr. Houston if I were to proceed not being prepared. And it 
was the determination that it may be considered to be inviting 
error. For those reasons, I guess we can't go forward on 
Wednesday. 
But I don't think that we should be in the position 
of having to ask for a continuance, although that seems to be 
where we have been placed. And we think that that's violative 
of Mr. Houston's due process rights. It violates the statute 
on expert notice. And I guess we need to then reschedule this 
trial. 
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THE COURT: And I just want to clarify my ruling a 
little bit. 
It is true that I have ruled that I will not exclude 
the testimony or the expert witnesses based on the 
noncompliance with the 30 days because I just simply did not 
find the bad faith necessary in the failure to comply with the 
30-day notice. The State has done it as quickly as they can 
in the trial setting. And so by not excluding the testimony, 
or excluding the witnesses I guess, by default, I guess that 
means I am granting the continuance and it is to the 
requesting party. 
What I asked the defendant then was, based on the 
fact that there is currently before me a 120-day disposition, 
I needed to have the input as to whether or not the defendant 
felt he could be prepared to go forward so that, even though 
the remedy I have provided and the remedy that is provided by 
statute is a continuance for the proponent party, I wanted the 
input as to whether or not the defendant felt that he could 
have a fair trial and be adequately prepared. That is the 
answer that Mr. Mack has given me today after consulting with 
both his client, Mr. Houston, and with the office. And they 
do not feel that they can be fairly prepared for the series of 
charges without having more time to examine the testimony 
which I have not excluded. 
The continuance, therefore, I guess, technically, is 
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being granted to the State because they have not provided, 
technically, the 30-day notice and they do need to do that. 
But the issue before me, which was more important to me, is 
just the granting of a fair and timely trial for Mr. Houston. 
The 120-day disposition date, my understanding, 
after reviewing the calendar with both Mr. Mack and 
Mr. Burmester, is April 12th. We can do what flexibility we 
need to set that during that time frame. The defendant is not 
waiving that 120-day request. 
Again, I know that there are other issues that I 
need to balance that against. And I will set it as quickly as 
we can, but we are to the March 11th date. That puts it 
within a month. I do have several other jurys that are set, 
many of them in custody, and I'll throw out some dates and see 
what we can. Whether or not that can be before April 12th is 
another issue. 
We have three days requested for this trial? 
MR. BUFMESTER: I think that would be best, to have 
three days. 
THE COURT: Have we received any word on whether the 
27th, 28th and 29th ~ 
(Discussion off the record.) 
MR. MACK; You know, I should let you know that I am 
out of town the week of the 25th and the first week of April. 
THE COURT: And the week of the 25th is a week that I 
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had another murder trial scheduled. We filled it up with 
other things, in fact, with another jury. If that date is not 
available to Mr. Mack, then — 
COURT CLERK; That one is not in custody. 
THE COURT: So we could do it. But you're out of 
town that week and April 1st as well? 
MR. MACK: I?m actually in town on the 1st. But the 
rest of that time, the 25th through the 5th, I am out of town. 
THE COURT: The week of the 8th I am on master 
arraignment calendar so that is the one week that is totally 
unavailable to me. And the 15th is the master pretrial 
calendar, so I don't have any options on that. That means 
then that — so I suppose we could look to next week but I 
have misdemeanor juries set. 
MR. BURMESTER: I don't know if that still gives them 
30 days. 
THE COURT: Yeah. All right. 
MR. BUFMESTER: I'm not sure what that does. 
THE COURT: You gave the notice on what date, on the 
25th? 
MR. BURMESTER: Your Honor, I'm sorry, I didn't bring 
my file over. There's three separate documents. And the 
precise date they went out, I'm not sure. But I know it was 
the week of the date that we actually set a trial date. 
THE COURT: And that, I believe, was on February 
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25th. Let me check on the docket. 
We scheduled the March 13th date on February 25th. 
And that is simply not even 30 days outside. The trial date 
was set closer than the 30 days from the date that this was 
first set for trial. And that's the basis of my ruling, not 
for excluding. 
If we go to the 27th of March, that is 30 days from 
the 25th. And it wouldn't have been amy earlier and it may 
have been a day or two later. So we are going to be to the 
week of April 1 before the 30-day notice has run. 
Do you want to set it on April 24th, 25th and 26th, 
which is actually a felony week? And we may have some 
in-custody but it won't have the additional issue of the 
disposition. 
Who have I got on the 24th, 25th and 26th of April? 
(Discussion off the record.) 
THE COURT: All right. Let's set this for April 24, 
25 and 26. And the record will reflect that that is past the 
120-day disposition. The Court knows that as we are doing it 
and it's past the 30 days for the expert-witness notice. But 
it is the soonest I can set it on the calendar, given that the 
defense counsel is not going to be here the first week of 
April and the 8th and 15th are master calendars for the Court. 
And I don't have the flexibility of setting during those 
weeks, so I am setting them the next available date that I 
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have for a felony jury. 
MR. MACK: Should we set one more pretrial? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. BUFMESTER: Sure. 
THE COURT: Yes, and also deal — do we still need to 
further deal with the State's motion in limine as to the 
admissibility of DNA testimony substantively, or was your only 
objection to the notice? 
MR. MACK: Well, why don't you give me a cut-off time 
to file an objection to that, Judge. 
THE COURT: It is a motion in limine and so you would 
not necessarily need to do that, but I think it is 
appropriate. We can just set a time and the State can respond 
on that. 
MR. BUFMESTER: Your Honor, if I may follow up. I 
cited to — I think it was in Judge McCleve's court. 
THE COURT: Butterfield? 
MR. BUFMESTER: Yes, in Butterfield. That case has 
since been appealed and had an opinion rendered. And I will 
provide the Court that opinion, which my understanding, in 
essence, it upholdfs Judge McCleve's ruling. 
THE COURT: When did that ruling come down, last 
summer? It was before you made the motion in limine. 
MR. BUFMESTER: Yes. I tried to get it in as quick 
as I could but I didn't have time to alter the memo. 
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The second thing is Gabriel Behr, serology, it is the State's point 
that it went out with the initial discovery, but certainly was completed by January 
16*. 
THE COURT: Was that before the prelim? 
MR. BURMESTER: That is mid-way. It is mid-way through the 
prelim. Again on January 15*, it was a half day. We couldn't continue on the 
16*, so we it was continued until the 24* when it was completed. 
Todd Rigley's report, he is the DNA expert and the State received 
his report on the evening of January 15*, after the first day of the preliminary 
hearing. And the prosecutor handed both defense counsel copies of his report on 
the morning of the 16 and that report was submitted as evidence at the preliminary 
hearing on January 24*. Again, the State is not saying that that is sufficient to 
comply with the statute. It is not, but I think it does affect whether this Court 
believes there has been bad faith and therefore good cause or not good cause. 
THE COURT: Any further response on that, on this motion? 
MR. MACK: Well, very briefly, Judge. So if I am hearing right 
and getting the dates right, by January 16*, it sounds like the State is saying that 
they have possession of it and have shared all expert reports by that date. So they 
well have complied with part of the statute well in advance of the trial being set, 
but it needs to be fully complied with, within 30 days of the trial being set. And it 
seems like the rest of it could have been done as well: the CV's or any other 
additional information they need to provide to comply with the statute. 
I think other than that, Judge, we will submit it. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Again, I would like to make 
sure that the record is clear and as much as the record, the parties are clear in that 
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1 this is an issue that may resolve an important issue. And certainly Mr. Houston 
2 had made the request to basically have pending cases resolved within the 120-day 
3 time period that is allowed for in-state circumstances like this one is. And he, in 
4 fact, Mr. Burmester, I believe, has been approaching all of these trial settings with 
5 that in mind. That Mr. Houston made that request early, and it is something that I 
6 need to look at seriously. But at the same time, I need to weigh everything and 
7 decide what is reasonable and what is not reasonable. And in fact that is why the 
8 findings that I need to make are not just whether or not it was one party or the 
9 other who made a mistake, or one party or the other who didn't comply. I need to 
10 be able to look at all of the circumstances and see whether or not the delay is 
11 reasonable. 
12 The delay in this case is from the April 12th date then. I don't 
13 believe there is any contesting on that, that the April 12th date would have been the 
14 first one that I need to determine. Correct? April 12th is the 120-day detainer? 
15 MR. MACK: Correct. 
16 THE COURT: And so the question is whether setting this trial then 
17 past that date, and with it being set on the 24th, it is 12 days then past the April 
18 12th date, was reasonable or whether there was reasonable cause for doing that. 
19 One of the delays certainly has to be that it was continued back in 
20 | February when it was first prelimmed and bound over to me and I first got the 
case in early February, that there was a delay at the arraignment because there 
22 I needed to be conflict counsel. And again, I don't know that it is necessary that I 
23 actually attribute to one side or the other what the delay was, but it is clear that 
24 J with the two defendants still pending trial that there needed to be a conflict 























The expert discovery issue is a little bit more problematic just in 
that there are some very specific statutory requirements that the State needs to 
make in order to meet their discovery requirements. They are required to bring in 
an expert witness. And again, Mr. Burmester apparently has met those 
requirements as far as giving the explanation and even attempted to give all of the 
information as quickly as this matter was set, but the matter was not set out 30 
days. The first trial date was within 20 days, so we technically could not make 
that 30-day notice requirement. Now whether he could have provided that 
information, even before I had set it for trial, is what Mr. Mack is arguing, and 
because of the fact that this has been presumed that it was going, and it has looked 
like it was going to trial, the defendant has wanted it to go to trial, and everybody 
has anticipated that it is going to go to trial, is meaningful argument but I do not 
think it is reasonable to say that it was not even bound over and any appearance 
before me and set for any trial date. I am not finding that their failure to comply 
was disingenuous because they really had to give what information they can and 
simply did not meet the technical requirement of the 30-day notice because the 
trial was set sooner than 30 days. 
They said they gave the information as quick as they could and 
even then the remedy for that is not to keep out the evidence but the remedy for 
that is a continuance. And I asked the defendant at that time, given the fact that 
we had two conflicting issues for a delay, as whether he wanted the time to have 
that expert testimony information, or if he wanted to stay the 120-day time period. 
And Mr. Mack talked with his office, discussed it with Mr. Houston, looked into 
the issues and determined that they did in fact need the time to correlate and 
adequately prepare. 
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1 Again, that is not unreasonable and, again, it was not something 
2 that I am therefore saying that the delay was on the part of the defendant. I am 
3 simply looking at all of the circumstances and finding that under those facts, 
4 without stating that the delay was specifically to the defendant, or specifically to 
5 the State, that under all of those facts it was reasonable to give everyone time they 
6 needed to meet the statutory requirements of expert notice, and that the delay was 
7 not unreasonable to reset this trial. The resetting was done as quickly as we 
8 could. 
9 A number of days were discussed and this was the first day that we 
10 could get all parties here, so the April 24th date, which is scheduled this week and 
11 which is apparently going forward, is a reasonable date as the court calendar and 
12 every other circumstance could be taken into consideration, if I find that it was not 
13 unreasonable to delay it because of the expert witness issue and the conflict 
14 counsel issue. 1 find both of those reasons good for delay, so I am denying Mr. 
15 I Houston's Motion to Dismiss because it was not held within the 120 days. 
16 That brings us then - -
17 MR. BURMESTER: May I approach, Your Honor? 
18 THE COURT: Yes. 
19 MR. BURMESTER:! will just give this to counsel now. He has 
20 already received a copy. This is a proposed copy of Findings of Fact, and 
21 Conclusions of Law on the issue, and that is a courtesy copy to the Court. And, 
22 j of course, it needs to go through counsel before the original can come. I will just 
23 give that to you in case if the Court has some problems with it. 
24 THE COURT: I appreciate that. I am asking to have the State 
25 j prepare the proposed Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law on this with these 
